Continued from Part 1...
In order to effect comparisons and determine positions in a hierarchy, differences must be made commensurate, usually by the application of a universal category. If by definition universal (Encarta: "applicable to all situations or purposes") means there is nothing outside the universal, how do universals deal with difference? Partha Chatterjee shows that under colonialism claims of both universality and difference had a tendency to slip into a development narrative, as we saw in Hegel, which was a way of temporizing and therefore assimilating cultural and historical difference. Difference thus produced deferral, based on an expectation of education, improvement and progress. Through this not-yet, primitive India could be brought into the grand master narrative, though not equally with Europe. What Chatterjee calls the "Rule of Colonial Difference" meant a deferral of identity or sameness, possibly an eternal deferral: if Europe is still progressing and India is behind, can it ever catch up?
This is the situation inherited by nationalist movements. Fanon explains that colonialism, "not simply content to impose its rule upon the present and the future," also "distorts, disfigures, and destroys" the past of the colonized societies. To fortify and legitimize collective identity in the present, nationalism must rehabilitate the past. Fanon sees this as a response to colonialism's totalizing discourse. In the nationalist psyche, to recreate a pure and uncolonized past is to find and recover the national culture. But for Fanon the attempt to recover the glory of a past civilization is doomed. It makes culture, which should be in constant motion and full of vitality, into an artefact, preserved like a museum piece, dead. This kind of nativist history is, in Nietzsche's words, not serving life. It resembles antiquarian history, which "merely understands how to preserve life, not how to generate it." Mummified, decaying, this is the past sucking the vigour from the present. We can see exactly this tension in Nehru. Although he wants to rejuvenate the universals he finds in India's past (to make that past live), he is also searching for mythological origins of the nation's essence.
This search for origins and essential identities often has the purpose of buttressing boundaries, demarcating identities, making precise the inside and outside of "authentic" culture. Tradition is one familiar means for this, and its invention and preservation seem to have been a feature of nearly all decolonization struggles. This reproduction of the (imagined) past often involves enforcing custom and tradition, sometimes in a repressive manner: "the fact that something has become old now gives rise to the demand that it must be immortal." (Nietzsche) Obsession with tradition is yet another form of fetishism of the past, privileging it over the present. In opposition to the domination of the West, difference is privileged. In the name of emancipation, this nativist history reverses the binary, valorizing the past and rejecting the modern. Different problematic same thematic, it remains within the colonial logic, since it presupposes that the colonized are living in the past, while Europe is modern and more advanced on the unilinear historicist scale.
This is the general problem for Others trying to reconstitute their selves as subjects, because, as Fanon says, sealed in Otherness the only way to have a subject position is to accept being the voice of the Other, to fetishize themselves, reproducing the racialized logic of same and other. It also explains the performance of nativism by native intellectuals and elites who feel they must "go native" to "get away from the white culture." As if the only way to participate in politics and society is to take on these identities. However, identity politics is simply another form of mimesis: first determine the Indian way of doing things, and then follow that script. It is puppetry, following the black man script because that appears to be the only way to enact a subject position. But whiteness has constructed blackness, so this is playing someone else's part without authenticity or real agency; taking on the voice of the Other is about sheer instrumentality.
What is tricky, as Chakrabarty reminds us, is to take on a subject position of difference that does not repeat the racialized self-other logic. Fanon recognizes how difficult this is, and says it indeed produces a sort of melancholy because for this there's no script. We want a living culture, a community with national consciousness, but what the hegemonic order means by "culture" is a given political identity. If culture is that which cannot be captured, the living vanishing present, what Balibar calls everyday practices of meaning, "culture can also function like a nature, and it can in particular function as a way of locking individuals and groups into a genealogy, into a determination that is immutable and intangible in origin."
Part 3
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